Labour share developments over the past two decades: The role of public policies Labour share developments over the past two decades have differed widely across OECD countries, with about half of them experiencing significant declines. This paper analyses the role of public policies in shaping labour share developments across countries. The results suggest that pro-competition product market reforms raise the labour share by reducing producer rents. Labour market reforms that strengthen the bargaining position of workers, such as tightening employment protection or raising minimum wages, may raise wages in the short term but risk triggering the substitution of capital for labour in the medium term. On average, across countries, such reforms are estimated to reduce the labour share. By contrast, promoting the re-employment of workers who lose their jobs through active labour market policies unambiguously raises the labour share. JEL Classification codes: D33, J38, J58. Keywords: labour share, public policies, difference-in-differences estimation *********
Several OECD countries have been grappling not only with slow productivity growth but have also experienced a slowdown in real average wage growth relative to productivity growth, i.e. a decline in the labour share. The evidence indicates that global developments in technology and trade have pushed real average wages down relative to productivity (Schwellnus et al., 2018[1] ), but large cross-country differences in labour share developments suggest an important role for domestic policies and institutions.
2.
Public policies can affect the labour share by changing the level and the distribution of producer rents as well as the price of capital relative to labour. Pro-competition product market reforms, for instance, are likely to reduce the level of producer rents while proworker labour market regulations and collective bargaining arrangements may shift the distribution of rents toward labour, thereby raising the labour share. Raising corporate taxes or reducing labour taxes may raise the labour share by reducing the price of labour relative to capital. Most public policies affect the labour share simultaneously through several channels. For instance, stricter employment protection rules may raise the labour share by increasing workers bargaining position, but may also put downward pressure on the labour share by raising labour costs relative to capital costs.
3.
The contribution of this paper to the existing body of research is twofold. Firstly, the empirical analysis is based on industry-level data, which allows a more credible identification of the policy drivers of labour share developments than existing studies based on country-level data (IMF, 2017 [2] ; Stockhammer, 2017 [3] ). In particular, the empirical approach taken in this paper allows controlling for unobserved country-and industryspecific trends that may bias estimates of policy effects in country-level studies. Secondly, the paper accounts for the impact of technological change and globalisation while systematically analysing a broad range of potential policy determinants in a unified empirical framework rather than focusing on a single policy as most of the existing literature (Azmat, Manning and van Reenen, 2012[4] ; Bassanini and Manfredi, 2012[5] ; Ciminelli, Duval and Furceri, 2018 [6] ).
4.
The main findings are as follows:
 For the OECD as a whole, the labour share has declined over the past two decades, but there have been large differences across countries. About half of the covered countries experienced significant declines whereas the others experienced constant or increasing labour shares, suggesting that domestic policies and institutions may play an important role in shaping labour share developments across countries.
 Pro-competition product market reforms raise the labour share by reducing producer rents that tend to accrue to capital owners.
 A tightening of employment protection or an increase in minimum wages exerts downward pressure on the labour share, suggesting that in the medium term the substitution of capital for labour in response to higher labour costs outweighs the upward effect through higher wages.
 Higher spending on active labour market policies raises the labour share by preserving labour market attachment and skills of workers who lose their jobs.
 The coverage and degree of centralisation of collective bargaining have no significant effect on the labour share, which could reflect the fact that higher shares of rents accruing to workers are offset by the substitution of capital for labour in response to higher labour costs.
 Changes in corporate taxes and labour taxes are found to have statistically insignificant effects on labour shares.
5.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the literature on the policy drivers of labour shares. Section 3 describes the empirical setup and Section 4 describes the industry-level data used in the empirical analysis. Section 5 provides empirical results and discusses possible policy implications. Section 6 concludes.
The role of public policies and institution: Literature review

6.
One channel through which public policies can affect the labour share is through the substitution of capital for labour (capital-labour substitution). Public policies that raise labour costs or reduce the cost of capital may reduce the labour share by raising capital intensity. Even if factor prices are determined competitively, the labour share declines with capital intensity if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is above unity. 2 By contrast, if the elasticity of substitution is around unity public policies that impact the relative price of capital have no effect on the labour share. 3 
7.
Public policies that directly impact the price of capital relative to labour include corporate taxes, labour taxes (such as social security contributions) and minimum wages. Collective bargaining institutions may raise labour costs and thus reduce the relative price 2 If factor prices are determined competitively, real wages are equal to marginal labour productivity, but this does not imply equality between real wages and average labour productivity. Real wages can decouple from average labour productivity even with factor prices that are determined competitively if the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is non-unitary. 3 Although Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014[37] ) obtain an elasticity of substitution in the range of 1.2-1.5 using cross-country and cross-industry variation in labour shares and relative investment prices, most estimates suggest an elasticity of substitution below one (Chirinko, 2008[34] ). The high elasticity of substitution implied by recent OECD studies could partly reflect the recent sample period as the elasticity of substitution between ICT capital that emerged in the 1990s and labour is significantly higher than for other capital goods and is well above unity (Tevlin and Whelan, 2003[35] ; Bakhshi, Oulton and Thompson, 2003[36] ). of capital by setting wage floors. However, a number of empirical studies suggest that collective bargaining institutions primarily affect wage dispersion rather than average wages (Dahl, le Maire and Munch, 2013 [7] ; Leonardi, Pellizzari and Tabasso, 2015 [8] ), which would imply no effect on capital-labour substitution. Pro-competition product market reforms may induce capital-labour substitution by reducing regulatory barriers to investment. To the extent that employment protection regulations affect overall labour costs, for instance by raising dismissal costs, they may induce capital-labour substitution whereas active labour market policies may limit capital-labour substitution by preserving workers' labour market attachment and skills. The empirical evidence on the impact of public policies on the labour share through capital-labour substitution is scarce. Using country-level data, (IMF, 2017 [2] ) finds no significant impact of corporate taxes on labour shares.
8.
A second channel through which public policies can affect the labour share is through the level of product market rents. When competition is imperfect, value added does not only include the marginal products of the factors of production but also product market rents. The creation of new products and services or regulations that limit competition in product markets allows firms to charge a mark-up over marginal costs. To illustrate the effects of an increase in product market rents on the labour share, it is useful to decompose value added into (i) labour compensation, (ii) required capital compensation and (iii) profits in excess of required capital compensation, i.e. product market rents. Assuming that product market rents primarily accrue to capital owners, an increase in product market rents reduces the labour share.
9.
Empirical evidence suggests that increases in product market rents have contributed to declines in labour shares, but this may only partly be related to restrictive product market regulations. Recent findings suggest that the decline in the labour share in the United States overwhelmingly reflects an increase in rents rather than an increase in required capital compensation (Barkai, 2016[9] ; De Loecker and Eeckhout, 2017 [10] ). Furman and Orszag (2015 [11] ) show that increased market concentration in the United States coincided with the emergence of supernormal returns on capital, further supporting the hypothesis that increasing product market rents have played a key role in the decline of the labour share. Autor et al. (2017[12] ) show that declines in labour shares in the United States were particularly large in industries that experienced the largest increases in market concentration. 4 Increased market concentration may partly reflect an increase in restrictive product market regulations such as licencing requirements for professionals or a less stringent enforcement of anti-trust policy (Furman, Orszag and Stiglitz, 2015[11] ). But it may partly also reflect technology-driven "winner-takes-most" dynamics that allow a small number of firms to gain a large share of the market (Autor et al., 2017[12] ).
10.
A third channel through which public policies can affect the labour share is through the sharing of product market rents. In an imperfect competition labour market, workers and capital owners bargain over the distribution of rents formally or informally (Solow, 2015[13] ). Pro-competition product market reform may not only reduce product market rents but also affect the bargaining position of workers. Labour market institutions such as minimum wages or collective bargaining institutions directly influence the distribution of rents between workers and capital owners (Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2003[14] ). In a crosscountry panel, (IMF, 2017 [2] ) finds no independent effect of changes in union density on the labour share once technological change and globalisation are taken into account. By contrast, using a cross-state panel in the United States, Machin (2016[15] ) finds that stagnating real median wage growth is related to declining union coverage.
11.
Most public policies affect the labour share simultaneously through several channels. Privatisation of network industries, for instance, typically raises product market competition and thereby reduces the level of rents but may tilt their distribution toward capital if private owners have weaker preferences for employment. Azmat, Manning and van Reenen (2012 [4] ) and Bassanini and Manfredi (2012[5] ) find that the downward effect of weaker preferences for employment dominates the effect of lower rents so that, on balance, privatisation reduces the labour share. An increase in minimum wages may induce capital-labour substitution but may also improve the bargaining position of workers. Strict employment protection may strengthen workers' bargaining position, thereby allowing them to appropriate a higher share of product market rents but also inducing capital-labour substitution. Ciminelli, Duval and Furceri (2018 [6] ) find that, on balance, deregulating employment protection reduces the labour share. The theoretical effects of public policies on the labour share through the above channels are summarised in Table 1 . Table 1 . Theoretical effects of public policies on the labour share Note: The theoretical effects of public policies via capital-labour substitution assume an elasticity of substitution above unity. Bold arrows indicate high levels of certainty whereas dashed arrows indicate low levels of certainty.
The empirical model
12.
The empirical analysis is conducted at the industry-level. Adopting an industrylevel approach to the modelling of labour shares is both conceptually and econometrically appealing. From a conceptual standpoint, the fact that changes in aggregate labour shares overwhelmingly reflect developments within industries rather than cross-industry reallocation justifies modelling industry-level labour shares to explain aggregate developments. 5 From an econometric standpoint, the industry-level approach has the advantage that country-and industry-specific trends can be controlled for through an appropriate fixed effects structure.
13.
The econometric model is estimated over the period 1995-2011 and focuses on medium-term changes in labour shares. For this purpose, the data is split into three periods of approximately 5 years (1995-2000, 2000-05 and 2005-11) . The analysis of medium-term changes rather than long-term changes over the entire period permits a more precise estimation of the effects of structural and policy drivers of labour shares while allowing labour shares sufficient time to adjust given that the elasticity of substitution between labour and capital is likely to be higher in the medium term than in the short term. 14 .
The difference-in-differences specification
The analysis of the impact of product and labour market policies on labour share developments follows the difference-in-differences approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998[16] ). 6 This approach uses within-country labour share differences across industries to econometrically identify the effects of public policy reforms. More specifically, it assumes that the response of labour shares to a given policy reform is greater in industries that are more exposed to this policy reform. This introduces an exogenous source of cross-industry variation in the policy shock which helps identifying the policy effect on labour shares. The advantage of using cross-industry data to identify the effect of public policies is that it allows to control for unobserved country-specific trends, which could bias the results in a simple cross-country setup. The disadvantage is that it does not allow to explain cross-country heterogeneity in labour share developments, as crosscountry differences in public policy and institutional developments are captured by the country-period fixed effects.
15.
The empirical specification takes the following generic form:
where subscripts i, j and t denote, respectively, countries, industries and periods; ∆ denotes the medium-term (5-or 6-year) change in the labour share; denotes the industry exposure variable relevant for public policy k; ∆ denotes the medium-term change in policy k; ∆ denotes medium-term change in the relative investment price ; ∆ denotes medium-term change in participation in global value chains; denotes control variables that vary at country-industry-period level, including the initial routine task intensity 0 ; and denote country-by-period and industry-by-period fixed effects. Given that the model is estimated in differences, the fixed effects pick up country-period and industry-period specific trends. 7 
16.
The impact of public policies on labour shares is inferred from the interaction term between industry characteristics and public policy changes ( × ∆ ). But the specification of equation (1) does not permit the identification of the average effect of public policies on the labour share across industries, which is captured by the country-byperiod fixed effects. However, the difference-in-differences approach allows detecting the existence of an effect. For instance, a larger decline of the labour share in response to an increase in the minimum wage in an industry with a high share of low-wage workers than in an industry with a low share suggests that an increase in the minimum wage has a negative effect on the labour share.
Industry exposure to policy reforms
17.
The next step is to choose exposure variables that are relevant for each public policy under consideration, but that are not affected by changes in policy. Choosing exposure variables that vary only across industries and are defined for a benchmark country and a benchmark period ensures that the estimated coefficients reflect the effects of changes in policies rather than changes in the exposure variable. 8 
18.
Pro-competition product market reforms can plausibly be assumed to have a larger impact on the labour share in industries characterised by high rates of firm turnover. Economy-wide product market reforms such as reductions in the administrative burden on start-ups can be expected to primarily affect industries in which competition is structurally feasible. In industries in which there are natural barriers to competition, such as natural monopolies, most economy-wide product market reforms will have little impact on productivity and wages and thus the labour share. In the below empirical analysis, the structural feasibility of competition is proxied by the firm turnover rate.
19.
Reforms of employment protection legislation can plausibly be assumed to have larger effects on the labour share in industries with high worker reallocation rates. Reducing the strictness of employment protection legislation reduces labour costs by reducing layoff costs, particularly so in industries that require high flexibility in layoff decisions, implying particularly large capital-labour substitutability in these industries.
20.
Changes in active labour market spending can be assumed to have a larger impact on the labour share in industries with high shares of low-skilled workers. Such changes are likely to be concentrated in industries with high shares of low-skilled workers since lowskilled workers are overrepresented in OECD unemployment (Escudero, 2018[17] ; Oesch, 2010 [18] ).
21.
Changes in the minimum wage and in collective bargaining institutions can plausibly be assumed to have larger effects in industries with high shares of low-wage workers. In these industries, the minimum wage is likely to be binding for a higher proportion of workers so that an increase will raise the average wage in the industry by more than in other industries. Whether this raises or reduces the labour share is an empirical question. In the short term, the increase in wages tends to raise the labour share if the employment response is modest (Card and Krueger, 1994[19] ; Card and Krueger, 2000 [20] ; Neumark, Salas and Wascher, 2014 [21] ), but in the medium term, which is the focus of the present paper, the increase in wages triggers capital-labour substitution (Lordan and Neumark, 2017[22] ). If the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour is above unity, this may raise labour productivity by more than the initial increase in wages so that the labour share declines. Similarly, collective bargaining institutions typically set wage floors at the national, industry, occupation or firm levels so that an increase in coverage or centralisation typically benefits low-wage workers more than other workers. 9 
22.
Changes in corporate and labour taxes directly change the cost of capital relative to labour. The reduction in the cost of capital implied by a reduction in the corporate tax rate can be expected to induce capital-labour substitution and a decline in the labour share. The implied reduction in the relative cost of capital and the associated capital-labour substitution should be larger in industries in which profitability is high. Similarly, the increase in the relative cost of labour implied by an increase in taxes weighing directly on labour -i.e. an increase in the tax wedge -should lead to capital-labour substitution. The implied increase in the relative cost of labour should be larger in labour intensive industries.
Data and descriptive analysis
Data
23.
The empirical analysis is conducted on 20 OECD countries over the period 1995-2011 for which the dependent and all explanatory variables can be constructed. 10 The primary, coke and refined petroleum manufacturing, housing and non-market industries are excluded from the analysis since labour shares in these industries are driven by changes in commodity and asset prices or by imputation choices (Schwellnus, Kappeler and Pionnier, 2017 [23] ).
24.
The industry-level labour shares are constructed from the OECD Annual National Accounts Database complemented with additional data from the archives of the OECD STAN database and the EU-KLEMS database. Labour compensation is the sum of compensation of salaried workers and the imputed compensation of self-employed workers. The imputation is based on the average compensation of salaried workers in the 9 If centralisation of collective bargaining has a negative impact on the wages of high-wage workers, as suggested by a number of empirical studies (Dahl, le Maire and Munch, 2013 [5] ; Leonardi, Pellizzari and Tabasso, 2015 [6] ), the estimated coefficient on the interaction between the share of low-wage workers and collective bargaining decentralisation measures a differential rather than an aggregate effect of collective bargaining decentralisation. 10 The countries included in the econometric analysis are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Even though industry-level labour shares could be constructed up to 2016 for most countries, some explanatory variables were not available after 2011 at the time of the empirical analysis. corresponding industry. 11 Labour compensation of salaried and self-employed workers is then divided by value added at factor costs to obtain industry-level labour shares. Value added at factor costs is defined as value added at basic prices less taxes net of subsidies on production. Using value added at factor costs in the denominator ensures that labour and capital shares of value added sum to one.
25.
Industry-level relative investment price indices are constructed from the OECD Annual National Accounts database with additional data from the EU-KLEMS database and the archives of the OECD STAN database. Price deflators for gross fixed capital formation are divided by value added price deflators in the corresponding industry. The same reference year (2000) is used for all indices. 12 26.
In line with previous studies, industry-level participation in global value chains is constructed as the sum of backward and forward linkages in vertical specialisation of production. Backward linkages measure the offshoring of intermediate inputs used in exports and are defined as foreign value added embodied in exports. Forward linkages measure trading partners' offshoring of intermediate inputs and are defined as domestic value added used as intermediate inputs in trading partners' exports. 13 For the sample of high-income countries included in this paper, increases in backward and forward linkages are likely to have similar effects on labour shares: offshoring raises specialisation on the most capital-intensive stages of production while trading partners' offshoring raises demand for capital-intensive intermediate goods. The data are sourced from the OECD TiVA database, the OECD Annual Accounts database and EU-KLEMS database.
27.
The industry-level routine intensity index is based on the occupation-level routine intensity index of Marcolin, Miroudot and Squicciarini (2016 [24] ). The occupation-level routine intensity index provides a measure of the routine content of occupations, based on 11 Depending on data availability, the imputation is based on hourly labour compensation or on percapita labour compensation of salaried workers. In the case of Belgium, Estonia and Ireland, hourly compensation and hence labour share are available from respectively 1999, 2000 and 1998. This measure is based on the assumption that within industries average wages of salaried workers and self-employed workers are the same. If within industries average wages of self-employed workers are below those of salaried workers, this measure overestimates the labour share (Elsby, Hobijn and Sahin (2013[3] ); DNB (2016 [41] ; 2017[42])). However, basing labour compensation of self-employed workers on their total income ("mixed income" in the national accounts) as suggested by DNB (2016 [41] ) risks overestimating the labour share in countries in which a large share of total income of self-employed workers consists of capital income. 12 Extreme outliers in ICT manufacturing for some countries likely reflect measurement error and are dealt with by using the relative investment price in ICT manufacturing for the United States as an instrumental variable for the relative investment price in ICT manufacturing for all countries. Dropping ICT manufacturing from the regressions neither qualitatively nor quantitatively affects the results reported below. Observations below the first percentile or above the 99th percentile of the distribution of changes in nominal investment prices are dropped. data from PIAAC. The routine intensity index measures the degree of independence and freedom in planning and organising the tasks to be performed on the job. The occupationlevel index is translated into an industry-level index by constructing the weighted average of the occupation-based index by industry, with the occupational weights by industry are obtained from the European Labour Force Survey (1995-2015) . 14 
28.
The policy indicators as well as the exposure variables for the implementation of the difference-in-differences estimator are drawn from a variety of academic and institutional data sources. The industry-level exposure variables are mostly from academic data sources, with the orthogonality of the industry-level exposure variables to public policy settings that is required for the validity of the difference-in-differences estimator being achieved by using industry characteristics in a benchmark country and a benchmark year. The policy indicators are from standard institutional data sources. More details on indicator construction and data sources for the industry-level exposure variables and policy indicators are provided in the Annex B.
Descriptive analysis
29.
While the aggregate OECD labour share has declined over the past two decades, there have been large differences across countries (Figure 1 ). OECD countries with significant declines in labour shares include Japan and the United States, but in a number of other OECD countries, including France, Italy and the United Kingdom, labour shares have remained broadly constant or have increased.
30.
Cross-country differences in labour share developments may partly reflect crosscountry differences in workers' skills and differences in firm-level dynamics (Schwellnus et al., 2018[1] ). But there have also been large cross-country differences in public policy and institutional developments, especially regarding reforms of product market regulation, corporate taxes, active labour market spending and the centralisation of collective bargaining, which may have contributed to diverging labour share developments across countries (Figure 2 ). 
Empirical results
Baseline
31.
The estimated effects of public policies and institutions are presented in Table 2 . The main results can be summarised as follows: 15  In line with predictions from the theoretical framework developed in Schwellnus et al. (2018[1] ), a decline in the relative investment price and an increase in participation in global value chains reduce the labour share.
 Pro-competition product market reforms raise the labour share (Column 2). 16 The impact of pro-competition product market reforms on the labour share is a priori ambiguous: while reductions in product market rents tend to raise the labour share, reductions in regulatory barriers to investment tend to induce capital-labour substitution. The empirical results suggest that the upward effect on the labour share of pro-competition product market reforms through a reduction in markups appears to outweigh the downward effect through capital-labour substitution. Assuming that the effect of pro-competition product market reforms is negligible in the least exposed industry, the average country-level effect can be approximated as the value-added weighted average in the remaining industries. 17 According to this approximation, lowering the indicator of product market regulation by one standard deviation of the cross-country distribution in 2013 (which corresponds to lowering it from the level in Germany to the level in the United Kingdom) would increase the labour share by around 0.8 percentage point.
 Reducing employment protection for regular workers raises the labour share (Column 3). Employment protection legislation can affect the labour share by influencing the cost of labour relative to capital and by changing workers' bargaining position. Empirically, reducing employment protection appears to affect the labour share primarily through the reduction in the relative price of labour and the consequent substitution of labour for capital rather than the weakening of workers' bargaining position. This is consistent with results in Cette, Lopez and Mairesse (2016 [25] ) suggesting that in OECD economies the strengthening of employment protection results in capital-labour substitution. 18 Using the previous 15 Results are robust to the exclusion of the benchmark country from the sample, i.e. United Kingdom for regressions including the share of low-wage workers as the industry exposure variable and United States for the other regressions. 17 The average country-level effects in this section are computed as follows:
, where subscripts j and k denote, respectively, industries and policies; 1 is the estimated coefficient on ( × ∆ ) in equation (1); denotes the crosscountry average value added share of industry j over the period 1995-2011; denotes the exposure value of the least exposed industry; ∆ denotes the change in policy k.
approximation suggests that lowering the indicator of employment protection by one standard deviation of the cross-country distribution in 2013 (which corresponds to lowering it from the level in Austria to the level in Australia) would increase the labour share by around 4 percentage points.
 An increase in active labour market spending raises the labour share (Column 4). 19 The results suggest that these policies can be effective in offsetting technology-or globalisation-related capital-labour substitution by preserving workers' labour market attachment and skills. Using the same approximation as above suggests that increasing active labour market spending by one standard deviation of the crosscountry distribution in 2016 (which corresponds to raising it from the level in the United States to the level in the Netherlands) would increase the labour share by around 5 percentage points.
 The coverage and centralisation of collective bargaining are not significantly related to labour share developments (Columns 5 and 6). This suggests that capitallabour substitution and changes in rent-sharing in response to changes in collective bargaining coverage and decentralisation broadly offset each other.
 On average, across countries, increases in minimum wages reduce the labour share (Columns 7). Increases in minimum wages may strengthen workers' bargaining position, but over the 5-6 year horizon considered in this paper the upward effect on the labour share through higher wages appears to be more than offset by capitallabour substitution. Using the aforementioned approximation suggests that increasing the minimum wage (relative to the median wage) by one standard deviation of the cross-country distribution in 2016 (which corresponds raising it from the level in Australia to the level in France) would lower the labour share by around 1 percentage point.
 By contrast, the tax wedge (the share of income taxes and social security contributions in total labour costs) and corporate taxes, which both influence the relative price of capital to labour, do not affect the labour share. To some extent, this may reflect measurement error in the exposure variables used for the difference-in-differences identification. For instance, industry-level relative profitability in the benchmark country may be a noisy measure of relative profitability in other countries and may thereby bias the coefficient on the interaction with corporate taxes downwards. The insignificance of the tax wedge may also reflect the fact that in the medium run social security contributions are partly shifted to workers (Bozio, Breda and Grenet, 2017 [26] ), which would imply that reducing the tax wedge raises wages net of social security taxes with only little effect on the overall cost of labour.
classifies over 100 legislative and regulatory actions related to employment protection into one of the three following categories: non-reform years, liberalisation reform years and tightening reform years. Second, their estimations do not systematically control for changes in investment prices or trade openness. Third, their empirical analysis is conducted on a slightly broader country and period sample.
 The results are robust to simultaneously including the policy reform indicators that are interacted with the same exposure variable. The estimated effects of changes in the minimum wage, collective bargaining coverage and its degree of centralisation are identified using the same assumption (larger response of the labour share in low-wage industries). Estimating the effect of policy reforms that are interacted with the same industry-level exposure variable separately rather than simultaneously may therefore lead to omitted variable bias. However, including them simultaneously does not alter the conclusion that higher minimum wages reduce the labour share, with the estimated coefficients remaining fairly stable (Column 10). Note: GVC stands for global value chains; PMR for product market regulation; EPL for employment protection legislation; ALMP for active labour market policies; and CB for collective bargaining. Public policies and institutions denote 5-year differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Weighted OLS, with the share of industry-level value added in total value as weights. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Column (6) includes an interaction term between low-wage workers and a dummy taking value 1 when a statutory minimum wage is introduced during the sample period. Source: See Annex B. 
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Sensitivity analysis
32.
The main concern with the difference-in-differences approach adopted above is that the effects of different policies are analysed one by one. For instance, reforms of employment protection and product market regulation are correlated and may both have larger effects in industries with large firm turnover, which makes it difficult to attribute the estimated effects to one policy or the other. To address this issue, the baseline specification is augmented with the interaction between the preferred exposure variable and another policy. 20 This sensitivity analysis is conducted for public policies with statistically significant effects on labour share developments in the baseline specification, i.e. product market regulation, employment protection, spending on active labour market programs and minimum wage.
33.
The results on the effects of product market regulation, employment protection, minimum wages and active labour market policies are broadly robust to augmenting the baseline model with the interaction between the preferred exposure variable and another policy (Table 3 ). For instance, the coefficient on the interaction of firm turnover with changes in product market regulation remains statistically significant and around -0.3 when interactions of firm turnover with changes in other policies are included in the regression model (Column 1). In the case of employment protection and active labour market spending, the estimated coefficient from the baseline model remains fairly stable but loses statistical significance in some specifications.
Table 3. Sensitivity to adding confounding factors
Selected OECD countries, 1995-2011
Note: PMR stands for product market regulation; EPL for employment protection legislation; ALMP for active labour market policies; CB for collective bargaining; and EXPO for exposure variable. The table reports the estimated coefficients on the interaction term in the column heading, with each row reporting the estimate when controlling for the interaction term in the row heading. Coefficients in bold font show the baseline estimates in Table 2 above. Public policies and institutions denote 5-year differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Weighted OLS, with the share of industry-level value added in total value as weights. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Source: See Table A.1 to Table A.4 in Annex A. 20 Simultaneously including all interaction terms raises issues of multicollinearity. 
Conclusion
34.
The results in this paper suggest that pro-competition product market policies that limit product market rents do not only raise productivity but also support a broader sharing of productivity gains. Prima facie the fact that, over the past two decades, average product market regulation has become more competition friendly in OECD countries appears inconsistent with the decline in the average OECD labour share. However, technological change and globalisation may have more than offset the wider sharing of productivity gains from pro-competition product market reforms, including by reinforcing "winner-takemost" dynamics that may have reduced labour shares in the technologically most advanced firms (Schwellnus et al., 2018[1] ).
35.
Promoting re-employment of workers who lose their jobs through active labour market policies can support the sharing of productivity gains. A large body of evidence indicates that technological change, globalisation and financial development raise productivity. However, the empirical results in this paper suggest that these productivity gains are not necessarily transmitted to workers, as capital-labour substitution reduces the labour share. Sharing technology-and globalisation-driven productivity gains requires policies that promote the re-deployment of workers displaced by these developments to better jobs, including well-designed active labour market policies (OECD, 2018 [27] ).
36.
Labour market policies that strengthen workers' bargaining position through increased minimum wages and stricter employment protection may raise wages but can have unintended side effects on the sharing of productivity gains. On the one hand, the strengthening of workers' bargaining position may raise wages, which tends to raise the labour share. On the other hand, in the medium term, the increase in wages may lead to capital labour substitution. If capital and labour are easily substitutable, the increase in labour productivity afforded by the increase in capital intensity may be larger than the initial increase in wages so that the labour share declines. The empirical results suggest that, on average across countries, in the medium term, the second effect dominates, with the labour share declining in response to increases in minimum wages and tightening of employment protection. However, a lower labour share does not imply that workers are necessarily worse off: wages may increase, disemployment effects may be small (Card and Krueger, 1994[19] ; Card and Krueger, 2000[20] ), and the decline in the labour share may entirely be explained by higher value added as capital intensity increases.
1.
This annex provides the full regression results underlying Table 3 . Note: Public policies and institutions denote 5-year differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Weighted OLS, with the share of industry-level value added in total value as weights. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Column (6) includes an interaction term between lowwage workers and a dummy taking value 1 when a statutory minimum wage is introduced during the sample period. In order to use identical samples in columns (2) to (8), missing values for changes in the associated policies are set to 0 and absorbed in an interaction term between firm turnover and a dummy that takes value 1 if the change in the associated policy is missing. Source: See Annex B.
(1) Note: Public policies and institutions denote 5-year differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Weighted OLS, with the share of industry-level value added in total value as weights. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Column (6) includes an interaction term between lowwage workers and a dummy taking value 1 when a statutory minimum wage is introduced during the sample period. In order to use identical samples in columns (2) to (8), missing values for changes in the associated policies are set to 0 and absorbed in an interaction term between worker reallocation and a dummy that takes value 1 if the change in the associated policy is missing. Source: See Annex B.
(1) Note: Public policies and institutions denote 5-year differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Weighted OLS, with the share of industry-level value added in total value as weights. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. Column (6) includes an interaction term between lowwage workers and a dummy taking value 1 when a statutory minimum wage is introduced during the sample period. In order to use identical samples in columns (2) to (8) , missing values for changes in the associated policies are set to 0 and absorbed in an interaction term between low-skilled workers and a dummy that takes value 1 if the change in the associated policy is missing. Source: See Annex B.
(1) Note: Public policies and institutions denote 5-year differences. Standard errors are clustered at the country level. Weighted OLS, with the share of industry-level value added in total value as weights. *, **, *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels. All columns include an interaction term between lowwage workers and a dummy taking value 1 when a statutory minimum wage is introduced during the sample period. In order to use identical samples in columns (2) to (8) , missing values for changes in the associated policies are set to 0 and absorbed in an interaction term between low-wage workers and a dummy that takes value 1 if the change in the associated policy is missing. Source: See Annex B.
(1) 
Collective bargaining coverage
Collective bargaining coverage is the ratio of employees covered by collective (wage) bargaining agreements to the number of all wage and salary earners in employment with right to bargaining. Missing annual observations are obtained through linear interpolation. Source: ICTWSS database.
Collective bargaining decentralisation
Collective bargaining decentralisation is measured by an indicator ranging from 1 (wages set by a centralised bargaining process) to 7 (wages set at each individual company). Source: Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World Database.
Corporate tax
The corporate tax is defined as the effective marginal corporate tax rate. Source: Oxford Centre for Business Taxation.
Employment protection
Employment protection is measured by the OECD indicator of employment protection legislation for regular contracts. The indicator ranges from 0 (least restrictions) to 6 (most restrictions) and captures protection against individual dismissals measured, among others, through redundancy procedures, mandated pre-notification periods, severance payments and the definition of unfair dismissals. Source: OECD Employment Protection Database.
Firm turnover
Firm turnover is defined as the sum of industry-level entry and exit rates for the United States over the period 1987-1997. The entry rate is defined as the ratio of new firms to the total number of active firms in a given year. The exit rate is defined as the ratio of firms exiting the market in a given year to the total number of active firms in the previous year. Source : Bartelsman, Haltiwanger and Scarpetta (2009[28] ).
Labour intensity
Industry-level labour intensity is defined as the ratio of labour expenditure to capital expenditure for the United States in 2002. Source: Bravo-Biosca, Criscuolo and Menon (2013 [29] ).
Labour share
The labour share is defined as the industry-level ratio of total nominal labour compensation over nominal gross value added. Labour compensation is the sum of compensation of salaried workers and the imputed compensation of self-employed workers. The imputation is based on the average hourly or per-capita compensation of salaried workers in the corresponding industry. Value added is expressed at factor costs and does not include net taxes less subsidies on production. Using value added at factor costs in the denominator of the labour share ensures that labour and capital shares of value added sum to one. Source: Schwellnus et al. (2018[1] ).
Minimum wage ratio
The minimum wage ratio is defined as the ratio of the minimum wage to the median wage of full-time employees. Changes in the minimum wage are set to 0 in countries with no statutory minimum wage. All specifications that include changes in the minimum wage additionally include a dummy variable that takes value 1 when a statutory minimum wage was introduced (United Kingdom in 1999, Ireland in 2000) or data become available during the estimation period (Estonia in 1999). Source: OECD Earnings Database.
Participation in global value chains
Participation in global value chains is defined as the sum of domestic value added embodied in foreign exports and foreign value added embodied in domestic exports (forward plus backward linkages). It is expressed in percent of gross nominal value added. Source: Schwellnus et al. (2018[1] ).
Product market regulation
Product market regulation measures the economy-wide regulatory and market environments. 
Relative profitability
Industry-level relative profitability is defined as the ratio of profits to gross value added normalised by the ratio in the median industry for the United States in 1997. Source: Schwellnus and Arnold (2008[30] ).
Routine intensity
Industry-level routine intensity is computed as the employment-weighted sum of highroutine occupations in an industry, with an occupation defined as being high routine if its routine content is above the cross-country 75 th percentile. The dummy for high routine intensity is set to 1 when the share of high routine employment in an industry is above the cross-country median. Source: Marcolin, Miroudot and Squicciarini (2016 [24] ) and European Labour Force Survey .
Share of low-skilled workers
The share of low-skilled workers at the industry level is defined as the average of share of adults with low literacy skills (under level 2), low numeracy skills (under level 2) and low problem solving skills (under level 3). It is computed as the average over the 20 countries of the sample for the reference year 2012. Data for problem solving exclude France, Italy and Spain since they did not participate in the assessment of problem solving in technologyrich environments. For these countries, the simple average across all countries is used. Source: OECD PIAAC.
